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The Regulation of Insurance Claim 
Practices 
Jay M. Feinman* 
Insurance claim practices determine the extent to which insurers will 
or will not honor their promises. This Article describes the failure in the 
market for claim practices, the failure of the regulatory responses to that 
failure, and the ways in which litigation can provide a partial corrective. 
The Article explains why the market fails to guarantee fair claim 
practices, how market forces might be improved, and why, even with 
improvements, market forces alone are not enough. It then describes claim 
practices regulation by state insurance departments, argues that regulation 
in most cases is insufficient, and suggests improvements in state regulation. 
Finally, the Article concludes that private litigation, in addition to 
redressing individual harm, serves a necessary regulatory function in 
promoting fair claim practices, and it describes the substantive law and 
processes that are needed to perform that function. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The paradigm of insurance distribution in the United States is the private 
market,1 and insurance in general and insurance claim practices in particular are 
prime examples of the use of regulation to facilitate and supplement the market. 
In his foundational article on insurance regulation, Spencer Kimball stated, “The 
major objective of insurance regulation is to facilitate the successful operation of 
the insurance enterprise itself.”2 But a hoary aphorism of insurance law states that 
insurance is imbued with a public interest, justifying the intervention of 
legislatures, administrators, and courts to supplement and correct the operation of 
the market and to serve nonmarket goals variously described as “important social 
objectives”3 or “egalitarian or distributional concerns.”4 
This Article describes the failure in the market for claim practices, the failure 
of the regulatory responses to that failure, and the ways in which litigation can 
provide a partial corrective. Market failure is endemic to the market for claim 
practices because of information asymmetries, agency problems, and the risk of 
opportunism by insurers. The response to these failures by state insurance 
regulators could include improvements in the market, intervention in disputes 
about claims, and focused or broad-ranging enforcement actions, but the response 
has generally been inadequate to the task. Private litigation, both coverage 
litigation and claim practices litigation—generally known as “bad faith”—also 
serves a regulatory function. For the regulation of claim practices, litigation is 
superior in concept and certainly in practice to administrative regulation. The 
Article concludes by describing the desirable contours of the law and litigation of 
claim practices to best fulfill its regulatory role. 
 
1. Mammoth exceptions exist, of course—Social Security, Medicare, the National Flood 
Insurance Program, state insurers of last resort, and more—but for most insurance the market is the 
usual form of distribution. 
2. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of 
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 477 (1961). 
3. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 63 
(5th ed. 2012). 
4. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 580 (3d ed. 2013). 
2015] REGULATION OF INSURANCE CLAIM PRACTICES 1321 
I. MARKET FAILURES IN CLAIM PRACTICES 
The regulation of claim practices, like most other forms of market conduct 
regulation, primarily serves to facilitate the operation of the insurance market and 
to remedy its imperfections. The function of the claim process is to fulfill the 
insurer’s promises and the insured’s legitimate expectations of coverage.5 
Therefore, the first step in determining the proper scope of the regulation of 
claim practices is defining the imperfections of and limitations in the market that 
may hinder the process in fulfilling its function. 
Market failures with respect to claim practices are of three kinds. First, 
insurance consumers do not possess adequate information to assess the relative 
quality of insurers’ claim practices, so there is not an effective market mechanism 
for influencing that quality. Second, the claim process is a strong example of an 
agency relationship, in which the insurer has freedom to act in a way that will 
affect the insured, but the insured has limited capacity to monitor the insurer’s 
behavior. Third, and in some respects a combination of the first two, insurers 
have the ability and incentive to act opportunistically at the point of claims. 
A. Information Problems 
Consumers need information for competitive markets to work well.6 In 
choosing among insurance policies and insurers, a potential insured ideally would 
have access to and would consider information about the insurer’s financial 
condition, the price of the policy, its terms, and the insurer’s record of servicing 
policyholders, including the quality of the claim process. Currently, and with some 
variation among lines of insurance and among jurisdictions, the market provides 
adequate information only on price. Personal-lines property/casualty insurance is 
sold largely on the basis of price, and information about the cost of insurance is 
easily available. Consumers can obtain quotes from different insurance companies, 
increasingly through web tools as well as more traditional sources.7 
Comparing policy terms is more difficult. Insurers usually provide 
summaries of some policy terms to shoppers but refuse to provide the actual 
policy language until after the policy has been purchased. Regulators in some 
states publish summaries of key policy provisions or the standard policies of 
leading companies online, but even then consumers require diligence and expertise 
to discover and parse the relative merits of policy terms. 
 
5. Issues of unfair discrimination or distributional concerns arise in the claim process only 
incidentally. Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Insurance Claims Discrimination, in INSURANCE 
REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 141 (Gregory D. Squires ed. 1997). 
6. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 6 (7th 
ed. 2011); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 62. 
7. Some regulators even have facilitated the process by providing price comparison tools 
online. Auto Insurance Premium Comparisons, CONSUMER AFF. & BUS. REG., http://www.mass.gov/
ocabr/insurance/vehicle/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-premium-comparisons.html  
[https://perma.cc/8YCE-7MWP] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
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Assessing the financial stability of insurance companies is both a collective 
action problem and an information problem, and regulation has substituted for 
market information to address these problems. Information about the financial 
stability of insurance companies is a public good that benefits all insureds but is in 
the interest of no single insured to generate, and measuring financial stability 
requires a degree of expertise that few insureds possess. The solution principally 
has been through regulatory barriers to entry as well as ongoing supervision and 
required reporting of the financial condition of companies, supplemented by 
private reporting services. 
Claim practices is the area in which the market has completely failed to 
provide adequate information to consumers (and, as is explained in Part II, 
regulators have largely failed to supplement the market as well). When choosing 
among insurers, insurance consumers have no means of evaluating and comparing 
claim practices—which insurer is more likely to pay promptly, fully, or at all for 
which type of claims? 
The sole theme in providing potential policyholders with information about 
claims practices is promoting a vague sense of security. For example, two of the 
most famous slogans in American advertising history emphasize insurance 
companies’ promise to provide security: Allstate’s “You’re in Good Hands with 
Allstate” and the image of cradling hands,8 and State Farm’s reassuring jingle 
“Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there.”9 Advertising indirectly evokes the 
claim process, but it always has been institutional rather than factual, aimed at 
providing a perception of security unsupported by actual information about a 
company’s claim practices. 
At this late date in the provision of information through advertising, it would 
be difficult for a company to benefit from providing information on claim 
practices. The data are not publicly available to document any claims, so the only 
plausible effort would be to mirror the institutional advertising of other firms in 
building or reinforcing a reputation for quality. 
Indeed, advertising the quality of claim practices is potentially dangerous, 
which may help explain the absence of such an emphasis. Insurance is sold as a 
measure of security. Promoting the possibility that security will be denied in the 
event of a claim, even by a company’s competitors, could diminish consumers’ 
belief in security and therefore diminish effective demand for all insurance. 
A related factor is the unlikelihood of consumers successfully processing 
 
8. See, e.g., You’re in Good Hands with Allstate (Allstate television broadcast advertisement 1950); 
Bootsy’s Commercials, Allstate Insurance Commercial (1986), YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2007), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWw600H7bg0; Mark Miller, Old Allstate Ad: 1950s Allstate,  YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 16, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69aMq4HiaZc. 
9. See, e.g., Like a Good Neighbor, State Farm is There (State Farm television broadcast 
advertisement 1971); CommercialsUSA, State Farm “Like a Good Neighbor” Jingle Ad—“Can I Get a Hot 
Tub?!?,” YOUTUBE (July 1, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OB6r2Wi0E98; State Farm 
Insurance, The State Farm® Legacy—Like a Good Neighbor, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9aS2JZkoQ4; State Farm Insurance, Like a Good Neighbor, State 
Farm is There.®, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaaHevyxvvA. 
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information about claim practices. Consumers often tend to discount risk, 
especially low probability, nonsalient risks, even if the potential loss is 
substantial.10 Even though one buys insurance to reduce the consequences of a 
potential risk, a consumer is likely to undervalue possible negative consequences, 
such as the occurrence of a loss and the possibility that a company will fail to pay 
in the event of a loss. 
Nor are consumers likely to have sufficient experience of their own with 
claim practices to assess the quality of a company’s performance. Most insureds 
never suffer a loss, few insureds suffer more than one, and even fewer suffer a 
substantial loss. Even including the experience of acquaintances, consumers do 
not have an adequate base of experience to assess a company’s claim practices, 
much less to compare it to a competitor’s practices. 
Moreover, even if a loss occurs and the claim process does not fully 
compensate the insured, the information inequality between a company and its 
policyholder produces situations in which the policyholder may not be able to 
evaluate adequately the company’s performance in the claim process. If a 
policyholder does not receive all that he or she expects in terms of payment or 
service during the claim process, the policyholder must identify the shortfall as the 
fault of the company, rather than take it as simply an unfortunate event.11 Because 
of the policyholder’s lack of expertise in understanding the insurance policy, its 
interpretation, and the technical aspects of the damages and its consequences, he 
or she is likely to accept the insurer’s explanation for the limits on coverage as 
correct even if it is not. 
Therefore, the market has produced little data that consumers can use on the 
relative performance of different insurers in the claim process, and it is unlikely 
ever to do so.12 
B. Agency Problems 
The second type of market failure in claim practices stems from the agency 
relationship inherent in insurance. In an agency relationship, each party may have 
different incentives and each may have access to different information, and these 
differences may affect their performance. That creates monitoring problems 
because one party who is subject to the other’s discretion either needs to incur 
 
10. BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the 
Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1422 (2007). 
11. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981). 
12. Nor are there effective intermediaries who generate or analyze data to provide shorthand 
forms of guidance for consumers. Partly, this is the result of the failure of the market to produce data; 
if there are no data to be evaluated, intermediaries cannot serve that filtering function. Partly, it is a 
collective action problem. Consumer Reports periodically surveys its members about their experience 
with insurance, including claim practices, but such surveys are necessarily limited in scope. Some 
websites seek to provide the information, but their data resources and reach are limited. See, e.g., 
VALCHOICE, https://www.valchoice.com [https://perma.cc/HTM6-QSKB] (last visited Feb. 17, 
2016). 
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costs in monitoring the performance or takes the risk of a disadvantageous 
performance. 
The agency problem is particularly acute in the insurance claim process. The 
insurer’s duties with respect to a claim are vague, and the policyholder is poorly 
situated to monitor its performance of those duties. 
Ex ante, the details of the company’s obligation are not specified in the 
policy. A typical HO-3 homeowners policy, for example, only requires the 
company to pay claims within sixty days of agreement or adjudication and to 
participate in appraisal; otherwise, it delineates no duties concerning processing of 
a claim.13 The homeowner, by contrast, is subject to eight specified duties, 
including prompt notice, cooperation in investigation, and submission of proof of 
loss.14 Indeed, it would be hard to specify the insurer’s duties because they 
necessarily rest on vague concepts such as promptness and reasonableness. As 
expressed in the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, for example, a 
company must “adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation and settlement of claims arising under its policies.”15 Even when a 
statute appears to narrowly specify a duty, the specification is usually qualified by 
a vague term.16 
Ex post, the insured has no effective means of monitoring the company’s 
performance in handling the claim. The vagueness of the company’s defined 
responsibly and the substantial advantage in information and expertise that the 
insurer possesses creates an inherent difficulty in monitoring the performance. 
More fundamentally, perhaps, the insurance contract presents distinctive 
agency problems because it combines sequential performance with the lack of 
substitute performances. The insured renders its entire performance first—paying 
the premiums. In the event of a loss, the insured cannot withhold its performance 
to provide an incentive for the company to fully perform its own obligation in the 
claim process. In a typical contract, if one party fails to perform, the other party 
can procure an adequate substitute performance, sue for any added cost, and, at 
least in concept, be made whole by the provision of damages. Insurance is 
different, however, as no insurer will sell insurance to compensate for a loss that 
has already occurred.17 A legal remedy limited to the recovery of the benefits of 
 
13. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3—SPECIAL FORM, at 15 (1999),  
http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GDY-N57V]. 
14. Id. at 13. 
15. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4.C (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 1997). 
16. In Tennessee, for example, an insurer is subject to a statutory penalty if it fails to pay a 
claim within sixty days of a demand by the policyholder, but only if “the refusal to pay the loss was 
not in good faith.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d. Reg. Sess.); see 
also GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1892 (2012). 
17. “[A] breach in the employment context does not place the employee in the same 
economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim or to 
accept a settlement offer within policy limits. When an insurer takes such actions, the insured cannot 
turn to the marketplace to find another insurance company willing to pay for the loss already 
incurred.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988). 
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the policy is also insufficient because it fails to fulfill the promise of security. That 
remedy does not give the insured the promised benefits until the litigation is 
concluded, perhaps years later, during which time the insured is likely to have 
suffered financial and emotional hardship and therefore to have lost the security 
and peace of mind for which he contracted.18 
C. Opportunism 
The third type of market failure, which is an extreme version of the agency 
problem, is the incentive and ability of an insurer to act opportunistically at the 
point of claim. In the context of economic relationships, opportunism is the 
practice of exploiting circumstances for selfish advantage without regard for prior 
commitment, or, in the colorful language of transaction-cost economics, “self-
interest seeking with guile.”19 A party in a relationship invests costs and limits its 
freedom of action in return for commitments from its contracting partner. In 
some circumstances, the partner can take advantage of the sunk costs and limited 
freedom of action by dishonoring its commitments, particularly where strong 
controls on such behavior are lacking. 
The ability to act opportunistically is inherent in the claim process. One form 
of opportunism rests on deceptive marketing: an insurer may properly deny a 
claim because it is not covered by the policy, but the insured’s expectations are still 
disappointed because the insurer marketed the policy on the basis of a perception 
of broader coverage or at least did not adequately disclose the policy’s 
limitations.20 A second form entails a violation of the insurer’s obligation under 
the policy, in which the insurer wrongfully delays payment of the claim or denies a 
valid claim in whole or part. In both cases, the fact that the insurer’s claim 
performance is subsequent to the payment of the premium, is only vaguely 
defined in the policy, and is not subject to effective monitoring by the insured 
presents a significant potential for opportunism. 
Opportunism is advantage-seeking behavior, and the advantage to the 
insurer is increased profit. Claim payments are an insurance company’s largest 
expense, so reducing payments has the greatest potential impact on a company’s 
bottom line. Delay in payments also is potentially beneficial because a company 
invests premium dollars until they must be paid out. 
The extent to which insurers act opportunistically is hotly contested. Insurers 
and industry representatives acknowledge that occasional mistakes are made but 
 
18. “Although the insured is not without remedies if he disagrees with the insurer, the very 
invocation of those remedies detracts significantly from the protection or security which was the 
object of the transaction.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986). 
19. Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 97, 
97 (1993). 
20. The potentially wrongful behavior here is at the front end of the insurance relationship, in 
the marketing of the policy. The remedies for this sort of opportunism include regulation of policy 
terms and greater mandated disclosure. Because the claim process plays only a supportive role in this 
type of opportunism, it is not the focus of this Article. 
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deny that there is systematic abuse. Industry critics argue in turn that companies 
have increasingly viewed the claim process as a profit center.21 What this debate 
certainly does is sharpen the questions about the regulation of claim practices. The 
purpose of regulation is to provide incentives and controls to further proper 
behavior in the claim process. Different incentives and controls are appropriate to 
correct occasional deficiencies—whether due to simple error or individual rogue 
adjusters—and systemic deficiencies that follow from institutional opportunism. 
The market provides limited checks on opportunism in the claim process. In 
lines in which the market as a whole is relatively stable, such as auto insurance, 
retention is important, especially because the cost of acquiring a customer may be 
so large that customers will not produce a profit for the company until their third 
or fourth year of tenure.22 A bad claim experience may encourage an insured to 
switch carriers if the insured is able adequately to evaluate the company’s 
performance in the claim process and identify the shortfall as the fault of the 
company, rather than take it as simply an unfortunate event. 
With respect to consumers as a whole, however, claim practices are not a 
major determinant of satisfaction or purchasing behavior. A company that delays 
paying claims or denies valid claims in whole or part conceivably could suffer a 
negative reputational effect, and reputation is an important element in consumer 
purchases of insurance. But claims satisfaction is not the most significant factor in 
overall satisfaction, particularly relative to price and among younger customers, 
the largest-growing segment of the market.23 
II. FAILURES IN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF CLAIM PRACTICES 
The presence of market failures means that market forces alone cannot 
ensure that insurance companies deliver satisfactory claim practices. The system of 
insurance regulation recognizes this fact and regulates claim practices in a number 
of ways. First, some regulation aims to improve the operation of the market for 
claim practices. Most of this type of regulation is directed at information problems 
that disadvantage potential insureds; some of it corrects policy terms that are 
particularly likely to cause problematic claim practices. Second, some regulation is 
more direct, setting standards for claim practices and enforcing those standards 
through administrative means. 
 
21. See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 56–120 (2010) (discussing changes to 
insurance companies’ approaches to the claims process). 
22. J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., STATE FARM AND GEICO CASE STUDIES: USING 
SEGMENTATION TO UNCOVER PROFITABLE CUSTOMER RETENTION OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2009), 
http://images.dealer.com/jdpa/pdf/09-US-PersonalInsRetention-MD.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBP8-
SHJN]. 
23. J.D. Power reports, for example, that of those auto policyholders who changed 
companies, 15.4% went to GEICO, even though GEICO only has a 7% market share. Of course, 
GEICO’s primary selling point is price. J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., 2012 U.S. AUTO INSURANCE STUDY: 
MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION 2 (2012), http://img.en25.com/Web/JDPower/2012_AIS_MD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WRW9-6E4Y]. 
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The current system of administrative regulation of claim practices standards 
is sound in concept. However, what is sound in concept is not realized in practice. 
Administrative regulation currently does not achieve enough regulatory 
intervention in the market to ensure that insurers engage in an optimal level of 
observance of claim practices standards. Indeed, as constituted at present, it 
cannot. 
A. The Failure to Improve the Market for Claim Practices 
Because the market is the baseline for the insurance mechanism, one 
potential approach to improving claim practices is improving the operation of the 
market, with particular attention to market defects that tend to produce 
problematic claim practices. A principal defect that regulatory efforts could 
address is the lack of information with which potential insureds can evaluate the 
relative quality of insurers’ claim practices so they can more effectively shop for 
insurance and, in the long term, create market pressure to improve claim practices. 
But regulators have made only very modest efforts to improve the information on 
claim practices available to consumers.24 
The most widely available source of information is consumer complaint data 
reported by state regulators.25 The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) collects the information from the states on its Consumer 
Information Source website, allowing consumers to search for complaint data on 
individual companies.26 
When consumers complain, their most common complaints are about 
improper claim practices. Nationally, of all complaints filed with insurance 
departments, delays in processing claims account for twenty-one percent of the 
complaints, claim denials for sixteen percent, and unsatisfactory settlements or 
offers to settle for ten percent.27 
The information about consumer complaints is incomplete and inexact; at its 
best, it can only help in making rough identifications of outlier companies. The 
strength of the data depends on consumer identification of wrongful behavior and 
taking the necessary steps to report that behavior. Because many insurance 
departments have limited or no authority to intervene in a policyholder’s dispute 
with an insurer, the policyholder has little incentive to report. 
Daniel Schwarcz accurately characterizes the presentation of consumer 
 
24. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance 
Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 414–20 (2014). 
25. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
WEBSITES: A CONSUMER ASSESSMENT (2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/state_insurance_ 
websites.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20090323193247/http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/ 
state_insurance_websites.pdf]. 
26. Consumer Information Source, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, https://eapps.naic.org/cis/
[https://perma.cc/ZT4N-SSDM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
27. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REASONS WHY CLOSED CONFIRMED CONSUMER 
COMPLAINTS WERE REPORTED AS OF JUNE 30, 2014 (2015), https://eapps.naic.org/documents/
cis_aggregate_complaints_by_reason_codes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GLH-9UAT]. 
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complaint data as “overlapping, confusing, and ambiguous.”28 The states and the 
NAIC define categories that are impenetrable: There are “complaints” by 
consumers that are different than mere “inquiries.” Some complaints are 
“confirmed” by the department and others are “justified” or just “closed.” 
Sometimes the company takes “corrective action” and sometimes there are “other 
outcomes.” With these definitions, the published data are of limited usefulness to 
consumers. 
The NAIC provides a template for data that could provide useful 
information. The Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS) provides a uniform 
reporting system for companies with respect to claims performance.29 Companies 
separately report annuity policies (for which there are no relevant claim practice 
issues), life, homeowners, private passenger auto, and long-term care policies. In 
homeowners insurance, for example, companies report information including: 
 Number of claims opened during the period 
 Number of claims closed during the period, with payment 
 Number of claims closed during the period, without payment 
 Median days to final payment 
 Number of claims closed with payment within zero to thirty days, 
thirty-one to sixty days, and so on 
 Number of claims closed without payment within zero to thirty days, 
thirty-one to sixty days, and so on 
 Number of suits opened during the period 
 Number of suits closed during the period30 
After companies report the data, the NAIC aggregates it and produces 
“[s]corecards . . . to show the jurisdiction-wide ratio and the distribution of ratios 
for all companies filing an MCAS in a given jurisdiction.”31 The data and the 
scorecards serve two functions. They provide a source for regulators to determine 
where regulatory activity such as market conduct examinations might be most 
advantageously deployed, and they enable companies to “gain a better 
understanding of where they fit in the insurance marketplace and what 
opportunities may exist to improve their performance in a jurisdiction by 
comparing their jurisdiction-specific ratios to the scorecard for that jurisdiction.”32 
As originally proposed by the NAIC’s market conduct committee, the data 
from the MCAS also would provide more information to consumers on which to 
 
28. Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and 
American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 756 (2009); see also Schwarcz, supra 
note 24, at 416–18. 
29. NAIC Market Conduct Annual Statement, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,  
http://www.naic.org/mcas_2013.htm [https://perma.cc/PRU9-PEQH] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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select an insurer. The industry reaction was strongly negative.33 As a result, the law 
in most states permits insurance departments to share the information with the 
NAIC only on the condition that it be kept confidential, so the public will not 
have access to it.34 
The data collected by the MCAS could be made available to the public and 
even could be expanded. More detail could be provided as to type of claim. For 
suits filed, additional information could be included such as how much the 
policyholder or accident victim claimed, how much the eventual settlement or jury 
verdict was, and how much the company was assessed in interest, attorney’s fees, 
and penalties. Even expanded in this way, the data in the MCAS would not 
provide a perfect picture of claim practices. Because different insurers have 
different market segments, for example, data are not wholly comparable from one 
company to another. Information breeds information, however, and if claim 
practices developed as a significant factor in the market for policies, companies 
would be pressed to explain differences and even improve the reporting system 
itself. 
Most consumers surely would not refer to such data when shopping for 
insurance, but the publication might have two salutary effects. First, it would 
provide a quantitative basis for competition in claim practices that might 
encourage the best performers to use the data in advertising. An insurer able to 
promote itself as the company most likely to pay a claim promptly or having only 
half as many policyholders forced to litigate claims might have a significant 
marketplace advantage. Second, intermediaries such as Consumer Reports or 
United Policyholders could compile and publicize indices of claim practices quality 
that would provide the information to consumers in a highly accessible form. 
The theoretical underpinning of markets is that competition breeds quality, 
and currently the lack of a market for claim practices means that insurers are not 
required to compete for quality in claim practices. In the absence of regulatory 
intervention, no market is likely to develop, and regulatory intervention at an 
effective level has not occurred and is not likely to do so. 
B. The Failure of Administrative Enforcement of Claim Practices Standards 
The administrative regulation of insurance takes many forms: licensing of 
insurers and providers, control over policy forms and premium rates, and setting 
financial requirements, among others. The regulation of claim practices involves 
setting claim practices standards and then enforcing those standards. 
 
33. See Jim Connolly, NAIC Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, PROPERTY CASUALTY 
360° (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/09/25/naic-insurer-conduct-data-
scheme-riles-insurers [https://perma.cc/Z6YW-62RY]. 
34. See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance 
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 734–35, 745 (2009); Schwarcz, supra note 24, at 415–16. The 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators’ Proposed Market Conduct Annual Statement Model 
Act section 8 provides for the confidentiality of MCAS data. 
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Currently there are numerous claim practices standards, some mandated by 
statute or administrative rule and others from common law. The NAIC’s Model 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, some version of which has been adopted 
in nearly every state, contains many standards, some general,35 some specific,36 
and some in between.37 Other statutes also set standards: for example, many states 
have enacted statutes that require payment of claims within specified time 
periods,38 and others have enacted statutes that more generally prohibit a company 
to “unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim,”39 with unreasonableness 
defined when “the insurer delayed or denied authorizing payment of a covered 
benefit without a reasonable basis for that action.”40 Some statutory standards are 
focused on potentially problematic elements of the claim process: California, for 
example, requires that the policyholder be furnished on request a copy of all 
claim-related documents41 and prohibits insurance companies from paying 
adjusters any part of their compensation based on the amount for which they 
settle claims.42 
Setting standards for claim practices by itself may contribute to adherence to 
those standards by insurers. Setting the standards clarifies expectations about 
behavior, and insurers’ institutional cultures may adopt the standards as internal 
norms. But that effect is limited. The basic principle of government regulation is 
that more is required. Outside entities, either regulators or private litigants or both, 
must have the incentive and mechanisms to enforce the standards, and the 
sanctions and remedies available to them must be sufficient to induce compliance 
by insurers. 
The NAIC’s Market Regulation Handbook identifies a “continuum of 
regulatory responses” for the analysis and regulation of market conduct.43 The 
 
35. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4.C (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 1997) [hereinafter UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT] (an insurer must “adopt 
and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and settlement of claims arising 
under its policies.”). 
36. Id. § 4.M (“[Insurers must] provide forms necessary to present claims within fifteen (15) 
calendar days of a request with reasonable explanations regarding their use.”). 
37. Id. § 4.K (“Unreasonably delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring both 
a formal proof of loss form and subsequent verification that would result in duplication of 
information and verification appearing in the formal proof of loss form.”). 
38. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1892 (2012); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2006 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (West 2012). 
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1115 (West 2012); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973 
(“The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable 
effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties 
shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.”). 
40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1115; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973 (“The insurer has 
an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle 
claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable 
for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.”). 
41. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 2003). 
42. See, e.g., id. § 816; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:2-17.8 (2012). 
43. 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK 2011, at 11 
(2012); see also Sharon Tennyson, State Regulation and Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry 9–10 
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elements of the continuum are (1) contact with the regulated entity, (2) market 
conduct examinations (MCEs), (3) enforcement actions, and (4) closure.44 Each of 
these elements may take several forms. Contact with the regulated entity includes 
interrogatories, interviews with the company, contact with other stakeholders, 
targeted information gathering, policy and procedure reviews, reviews of self-audit 
and self-review documents, and review of voluntary compliance programs.45 
MCEs may take the form of “desk examinations” of a company’s documents or 
on-site reviews.46 Enforcement actions range from an agreement for a voluntary 
compliance plan through ongoing monitoring and self-audit to fines or even 
revocation of the insurer’s license.47 Closure may include determining that no 
further action is needed; communicating the insurance department’s position; 
providing education, communication, or notices to insurers; ongoing, 
nonstructured monitoring; and requesting legislative or regulatory rule changes.48 
Along this continuum of claim-practice regulation, three elements are most 
important: the handling of consumer complaints, market conduct examinations, 
and enforcement actions.49 
 
1. Handling Consumer Complaints 
Every state insurance regulator receives and processes in some ways 
questions and complaints from policyholders about their insurers.50 This 
mechanism has the potential to enforce claim practices standards, although the 
effect is at best indirect and the potential is seldom realized. 
When a policyholder files a complaint with an insurance department, 
typically the department separates complaints from simple inquiries and, if the 
former, determines if it has jurisdiction. Then the complaint is sent to the insurer 
for its response. Upon receiving the response, a department employee may discuss 
the response with the insurer and consumer in an attempt to reach a common 
understanding or voluntary resolution of the complaint. In all but a few 
jurisdictions, the department lacks the authority to authoritatively resolve the 
complaint and may in any event refrain from doing so to avoid taking a formal 
 
(Networks Fin. Inst. Policy Brief No. 2008-PB-03, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1106172. 
44. 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 43, at 13. 
45. Id. at 13–16. 
46. Id. at 16–17. 
47. Id. at 17–19. 
48. Id. at 19–21. 
49. In addition to these principal types of regulation, regulators sometimes mandate 
alternative dispute resolution such as mediation for claim disputes; such processes may have an 
incidental effect of encouraging adherence to claim practices standards. 
50. See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 750; William C. Whitford & Spencer L. Kimball, Why Process 
Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin, 1974 WIS. L. 
REV. 639, 646 (1974). The inquiry and complaint process involves other issues as well, such as those 
concerning premiums and nonrenewal. 
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regulatory action.51 
The processing of consumer inquiries and complaints serves three functions 
for insurance regulators.52 First, and the most obvious, is the resolution of 
disputes between insurers and their policyholders, particularly small value disputes. 
Second, disputes provide regulators with information about failures to adhere to 
claim practices standards, either by individual companies or in types of situations, 
and that information may spur other regulatory action. Third, the process has an 
affective function—for the department itself by generating goodwill, as it appears 
to be helpful, and for insurers by legitimizing claim denials or potentially 
contentious claim practices. 
Given the variety of practices across the jurisdictions, it may be hard to reach 
general conclusions about regulators’ relative weighting of these objectives and 
their success in achieving them. The existence of the complaint process may itself 
contribute to the dispute resolution function and to an extent the affective 
function. Referring consumer complaints to an insurer may spur company review 
of the underlying matter, particularly review by a decision maker not involved in 
the initial determination, that may result in a change of position in some number 
of cases.53 This is particularly true for low-value cases or complaints brought by 
less sophisticated consumers; in those cases any means of dispute resolution is 
likely to be better than nothing. 
Nevertheless, as a structural matter there is reason to doubt the efficacy of 
the complaint mechanism in enforcing claim practices standards. The caseloads of 
employees who process complaints often preclude extensive involvement. One 
survey reports that in fifteen states complaint handlers have caseloads of 600 cases 
or more, and in seven states of 1000 or more.54 The result of such overload is 
predictable: nearly half of the states are unable to process all the consumer 
complaints they receive.55 Regulators often refuse to address complaints in which 
there is an unresolved legal or factual issue, which certainly constitute a large 
portion of the complaints, both because such cases are resource intensive and 
because departments often consider the resolution of such issues beyond their 
authority. If the complaints are serious, they may warrant litigation and regulators 
then defer investigation.56 As a matter of law and practice, the regulator’s role is 
 
51. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 753. 
52. Whitford & Kimball, supra note 50, at 670. 
53. Id. at 675. 
54. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 757. 
55. Id. at 756–57. Because of industry influence, the NAIC historically also has limited funds 
to devote to market conduct issues. See Scot J. Paltrow, The Converted: How Insurance Firms Beat Back an 
Effort for Stricter Controls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1998, at A1. 
56. The focus of the dispute-resolution process is low-value complaints. For example, the 
California insurance department asks on its complaint form if the complainant is represented by a 
lawyer and states that if litigation is ongoing or pending, “If yes, we may defer the regulatory 
investigation until the finality of the litigation. We ask that you still complete this form so we have a 
record of your issue. Once the matter is concluded, we would welcome any information regarding 
violations of insurance law by the insurer that you or your attorney are willing to provide.”   
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CSD-001-P, REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA) (2014), 
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less about adjudication and more a form of alternative dispute resolution. Most 
departments lack the statutory authority to compel a resolution of the case by the 
insurer, so its employees act as an intermediary, making inquiries of the insurer, 
perhaps offering independent views on the merits of the case and attempting to 
achieve a voluntary resolution. The employees are not powerless in this process 
because the threat of regulatory action, however attenuated, is always present. 
Ultimately, however, the resolution of the complaint rests on the insurer agreeing 
to it.57 Therefore, even though department employees may refer to claim practices 
standards when they do seek resolution of complaints,58 their ability to enforce the 
standards is limited. Nor are complaints likely to be a significant factor in 
identifying broad regulatory problems: less than one-half of one percent of 
complaints are referred to a department’s market conduct division for 
consideration of a broader regulatory issue.59 
2. Market-Conduct Examinations 
Market-conduct examinations can be directed at a number of areas, including 
marketing and sales, underwriting and rating, and producer licensing as well as 
claim practices. The guiding philosophy of market-conduct examinations was 
stated in the NAIC’s first Market Conduct Surveillance Handbook: 
Since it is inevitable that all companies will, on occasion, make errors that 
result in unfair treatment of policyholders, market conduct surveillance 
must be selective. It can only be effective if it focuses on general business 
practices as opposed to instances of treatment of policyholders or 
claimants, which may be infrequent or unintentional. 
. . . [A] company engag[es] in a general business practice [when]: 
1. The underlying cause of the problem, regardless of its frequency, can 
be traced to a company policy or regularly followed procedure as 
distinguished from an unintentional error. 
2. The frequency of the problem—e.g., the percentage of auto policies 
incorrectly rated—is significantly greater for the company than the 
standard determined acceptable.60 
While solvency regulation and rate regulation historically have been the areas 
of greatest focus for insurance regulators, efforts have been made in recent 
decades to improve market-conduct regulation, including but not limited to the 
regulation of claim practices. In the early 1970s the NAIC engaged McKinsey & 




57. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 755–59. 
58. See Whitford & Kimball, supra note 50, at 678. 
59. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 753. 
60. II. Rationale and History of Market Conduct Surveillance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. 
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/policy/ii-history.html [https://perma.cc/5Z29-EFSF] (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016) (underlining in original). 
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improving financial surveillance of insurers and market conduct.61 Its 
recommendations contributed to the development of a coordinated but voluntary 
system for the collection of consumer-complaint data and the drafting of the 
NAIC’s first Market Conduct Surveillance Handbook in 1974. 
Despite the NAIC’s efforts at reform, progress was seen to be slow.62 In 
2003, the federal General Accounting Office found that market analysis and on-
site examinations were used inconsistently, resulting in gaps in regulation in some 
instances and duplication in others.63 Since then, two trends in MCEs have been 
reported. First, the NAIC continued its efforts at reform, particularly by 
inaugurating new systems for the collection of market conduct data.64 Second, 
regulators have relied less on MCEs in recent years. Between 2003 and 2005, for 
example, the total number of all examinations dropped by eighteen percent; on-
site, single-tate, targeted examinations fell by thirty percent, and lengthy 
examinations fell by a third and high-cost examinations by two-thirds.65 
Despite these efforts, the state-based system with national but nonbinding 
coordination has produced substantial complaints by insurers that market conduct 
examinations are expensive, duplicative, and wasteful. The Federal Insurance 
Office’s report and recommendation on regulatory reform noted that: 
Market conduct regulation has been the focus of significant criticism by 
industry and third-party commentators. The principal reasons are that 
state regulators often fail to adequately coordinate market conduct 
examinations, resulting in multiple examinations for the same or similar 
sets of issues, with all the attendant burdens and inefficiency.66 
Robert Klein, one of the most widely published scholars of insurance regulation, 
 
61. Robert W. Klein & James W. Schact, An Assessment of Insurance Market Conduct Surveillance, 
20 J. INS. REG. 51, 61 (2001); II. Rationale and History of Market Conduct Surveillance, supra note 60. 
Ironically, McKinsey would play a major role in redesigning insurance company claim practices to 
augment company profits. 
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-433, INSURANCE REGULATION: COMMON 
STANDARDS AND IMPROVED COORDINATION NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MARKET REGULATION 
3–4 (2003). 
63. See id. at 18. 
64. For example, NAIC sponsors the Internet–State Interface Technology Enhancement, 
known by its acronym I-Site. I-Site contains data on examinations, investigations, and complaints 
supplied by state regulators and insurers’ quarterly and annual financial statements, permitting 
regulators to assess market conduct issues across the jurisdictions. The effectiveness of I-Site is 
limited by the data supplied to it by individual regulators, and under-reporting or inconsistent 
reporting can be a problem. CAN. COUNCIL OF INS. REGULATORS, RISK-BASED MARKET 
REGULATION: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 6 (2004). The NAIC also supports the Market Conduct 
Annual Statement, which collects and reports data on a variety of issues including claim practices, 
with company-level data made available to regulators and insurers and industry-level data by state 
made available to the public. The MCAS also produces reports on “outliers” among “nationally 
significant companies” with regard to underwriting and claims handling, which may require special 
attention. 
65. News Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs, Surveys Indicate Progress Toward Market 
Regulation Reforms ( June 13, 2006) (on file with author). 
66. FED. INS. OFFICE, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 53 (2013). 
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concurs and comments that MCEs disserve the public as well as insurers: 
“Currently, the states subject insurers to extensive, duplicative and costly 
examinations that focus too much on minor errors and too little on major patterns 
of abuse. In other words, regulators ‘miss the forest for the trees.’”67 
Individual states’ experiences of MCEs are highly variable.68 Without a broad 
study of market conduct examinations in all states and across states, 
generalizations like those above are hard to document. That study has not been 
done,69 and to the extent that the NAIC collects and collates data, it is not 
available to the public. As a possibly representative example of what one might 
describe as the ordinary use of MCEs, consider a snapshot of the New Jersey 
experience. The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance reports having 
conducted fifty-four market conduct examinations over the past nine years, with a 
high of nine concluded in one year and a low of three.70 A probably typical 
example is an MCE of Esurance Insurance Company of New Jersey.71 The 
examination was an on-site examination conducted under the standards prescribed 
in the NAIC handbook. The examiners purported to “check[ ] for compliance 
with all applicable statutes and regulations that govern timeliness requirements in 
settling first and third party claims. The examiners conducted specific reviews 
placing emphasis on” the state’s adoption of the Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act and other relevant statutes.72 They detected error ratios of twenty-
three percent in paid claims and nine percent in denied claims.73 The errors found 
principally were failing to pay within the legal time limits without obtaining an 
extension; also noted were failure to pay interest or sales tax due and failure to 
give required notices. These errors fairly can be described as systemic—delaying 
or underpaying claims in one out of four paid claims and one out of eleven 
denied. Nevertheless, no enforcement action was taken. Instead, the department 
ordered and the company agreed that the company “has taken or will take 
 
67. Robert W. Klein, Principles for Insurance Regulation: An Evaluation of Current Practices and 
Potential Reforms, 37 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 175, 195 (2012). 
68. FED. INS. OFFICE, supra note 66, at 53. 
69. Tom Baker, Qualitative and Quantitative Research on Tort Law Topics: A Comment on Helland & 
Klick and Kritzer, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, art. 4, 2007, at 4, 5. There are no significant law review articles 
about market-conduct regulation, no significant insurance-treatise descriptions, and, apart from the 
report commissioned by the NAIC, no systematic empirical research (at least that I have found). 
Knowledgeable insurance-industry insiders regularly complain to me that market-conduct exams are 
an expensive, paper driven, and mindless process that punishes insurance companies for minor 
mistakes while completely ignoring real problems. I am in no position to evaluate these complaints, 
but the alleged failure of market-conduct examiners to uncover the apparently massive UNUM/
Provident disability insurance fraud provides some support for it. 
70. See generally Market Conduct Examination Reports, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING & INS., 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_consumers/insurance/marketconductexams.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A8TU-XACM]. 
71. STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING & INS., MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION OF 
ESURANCE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY (2012), http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_consumers/
insurance/mcexams/esuranceadoptrpt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AXF-Y39M]. 
72. Id. at 4. 
73. Id. at 4–5. 
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corrective measures” and the department would reexamine the company within 
two years.74 
Timeliness and the required notices are important. But the MCE’s modest 
focus on “timeliness” (modest because the systemic errors were not regarded as 
serious enough to penalize Esurance) ignores many other statutory 
requirements—for example, those that prohibit: 
c. Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; 
d. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation 
based upon all available information; 
f. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable 
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; [and] 
g. Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due 
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts 
ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds.75 
In Klein’s metaphor, the New Jersey experience suggests that too often MCEs 
focus on the trees rather than the forest, and not particularly tall trees at that. 
Less ordinary but significant is the use of MCEs following high-profile 
events or spurred by other outside forces. The California Insurance Commissioner 
performed a market conduct examination of State Farm’s response to the 1994 
Northridge earthquake,76 and the Mississippi Insurance Department examined the 
company’s response to Hurricane Katrina claims.77 Several high-profile MCEs 
also have been precipitated by litigation. For example, a market-conduct 
examination by the North Dakota Department of Insurance examined the 
employee-incentive policies of Farmers Insurance and concluded that Farmers set 
goals for adjusters that were “arbitrary and unfair to policyholders and 
claimants.”78 A multistate market-conduct examination of Allstate’s use of 
Colossus, an expert system for evaluating general damages in auto personal injury 
claims, concluded in 2010 that the use of the system had not led to “systemic 
underpayment of . . . claims” but that Allstate needed to “enhanc[e] its 
management oversight of Colossus to ensure that it adheres to established criteria 
and a uniform methodology in selecting claims to be used to ‘tune’ or modify the 
 
74. Esurance Ins. Co. of N.J., Order No. E12-68 (N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins. May 31, 2012) 
(consent order). 
75. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 (West 2012). 
76. CAL. DEP’T OF INS., MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT OF STATE FARM 
FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY (NAIC # 25143) AND STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY (NAIC #25151) (1998), http://mail.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/rp/rp000620.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/2L3E-CNDS]. 
77. MISS. DEP’T OF INS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TARGET EXAMINATION (KATRINA 
HOMEOWNER CLAIMS) OF STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES (SPECIFICALLY STATE FARM FIRE 
& CASUALTY COMPANY) (2008), http://www.ins-compliance.com/images/inscomp/PDFs/2008/
1103_MS_State_Farm_MC_Exam_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE6L-N5H8]. 
78. N.D. INS. DEP’T, MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT: FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE 3 (2007). 
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software to reflect recently settled claims.”79 Each of these followed high-profile 
litigation about the subjects of the examination. 
Market conduct examinations can be and in some cases are effective 
administrative tools for regulating claim practices. But experience suggests that 
their use has been intermittently and not always effectively focused on claim 
practices because of resources and a limited focus, as well as because of the 
broader issues discussed in Section II.C below. 
3. Enforcement Actions 
In every jurisdiction, insurance regulators have the authority to directly 
enforce claim practices standards through penalties for violations of the standards 
and through cease and desist orders.80 The NAIC’s Model Act provides that when 
a commissioner has “reasonable cause to believe that an insurer . . . is engaging in 
any unfair claims practice” as defined by the statute, the commissioner “shall” 
issue a notice and conduct a hearing.81 Upon a finding of a violation, the 
commissioner issues a cease and desist order and “may, at the commissioner’s 
discretion” impose monetary penalties or even, in the extreme, revoke the 
insurer’s license. 
Under the Model Act and many statutes, penalties are tiered. First, higher 
penalties are imposed for violations committed “flagrantly and in conscious 
disregard” of the statute.82 Under the Model Act, for example, the specified 
penalty is not more than $1,000 per violation, or $25,000 per flagrant and 
conscious violation.83 Second, penalties are subject to an aggregate limit of 
$100,000 for ordinary violations or $250,000 for flagrant violations. Jurisdictions 
have adopted different versions of these penalties. Connecticut, for example, has 
modest penalties of $5,000 per violation and $50,000 in the aggregate per six-
month period for ordinary violations and $25,000 per/$250,000 aggregate for 
violations of which the offender knew or should have known.84 Others are more 
dramatic; Illinois, for instance, has a penalty up to $250,000 for a single violation 
 
79. News Release, N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t, Allstate Agrees to $10 Million Regulatory Settlement 
over Bodily Injury Claim Handling Processes (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/
press/p1010181.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZCS-VW6S]. 
80. See generally Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfield, The Punitive Damages Lottery Chase Is Over: 
Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faith and Does It Provide an Alternative 
Deterrent?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221 (2005); Steven Plitt, Regulating Insurance Company Claim Handling 
Practices: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Abandonment of the Common Law Tort of Bad Faith), 29 NO. 1 INS. 
LITIG. REP. 5 (2007). 
81. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 5 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 1997). Although the statute is directive and not discretionary (“shall,” not “may”), the 
vagueness of the reasonable-cause standard and the lack of a means of enforcing the requirement 
raise the possibility that regulators may not observe the requirements of the statute in practice and 
may fail to initiate enforcement proceedings in all circumstances when there is reasonable cause to do 
so. No studies of this issue have been reported. 
82. Id. § 6(A). 
83. Id. 
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-817 (2015). 
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with no aggregate cap.85 
A few states provide guidance on determining the scale of penalties to be 
imposed. For example: 
In determining the penalty imposed under (d) and (e) of this section, the 
director shall consider the amount of loss or harm caused by the violation 
and the amount of benefit derived by the person by reason of the 
violation and may consider other factors, including the seriousness of the 
violation, the promptness and completeness of remedial action, whether 
the violation was a single act or a trade practice, and deterrence of the 
violator or others.86 
Or: 
The Division of Insurance . . . shall consider all pertinent facts and 
circumstances to determine the severity and appropriateness of action to 
be taken . . . including but not limited to, the following: 
1. The magnitude of the harm to the claimant or insured; 
2. Any actions by the insured, claimant, or insurer that mitigate or 
exacerbate the impact of the violation; 
3. Actions of the claimant or insured which impeded the insurer in 
processing or settling the claim; 
4. Actions of the insurer which increase the detriment to the claimant 
or insured. The director need not show a general business practice in 
taking administrative action for these violations.87 
There is an important qualification to even the largest penalties. The Model 
Act specifies a variety of unfair practices, but those practices constitute statutory 
violations only if they are committed “flagrantly and in conscious disregard” of the 
Act or “with such frequency to indicate a general business practice to engage in 
that type of conduct.”88 The great majority of statutes include the requirement that 
prohibited acts constitute a violation only if committed “with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice” or similar language.89 Therefore, single 
violations, occasional violations, or even repeated violations that do not rise to the 
level of “a general business practice” are not really violations at all. 
Thus the enforcement mechanisms are limited in two significant ways. First, 
an insurer may violate the statute but the violation may not subject it to an 
enforcement proceeding unless the violation is a regular and repeated practice or 
is flagrant and intentional; the regulators lack the authority to sanction serious 
violations that are merely reckless or occasional. Under a more robust regulatory 
 
85. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.8 (2015). 
86. ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.910 (2014). 
87. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-68 (2015). 
88. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 3 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 1997). 
89. Id. § 3(B). Section 3(A) offers a variation prohibits violating the statute “flagrantly and in 
conscious disregard” of the law. Id. § 3(A). For a general discussion, see Plitt & Kriegsfield, supra note 
80, at 1248–50. 
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enforcement system, factors such as regularity and intent would go to the extent 
of the penalty, not the presence of a violation. Second, the statutory penalties 
available in many jurisdictions are exceedingly small. Individual penalties in the 
thousands of dollars and aggregate limits in the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
are unlikely to provide a substantial deterrent to insurers with premium income in 
the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.90 
Even in those jurisdictions with significant penalties available, their use in 
claim practices cases is arguably insufficient. As with market-conduct 
examinations, a national survey of enforcement actions is needed to demonstrate 
the full scope of administrative enforcement of claim practices standards. But 
again, one state’s experience may be a useful example. During 2013 the Insurance 
Division of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance issued 123 
consent orders, final orders, and orders to show cause.91 Of these, 118 were 
directed at insurance agents, public adjusters, bail bondsmen, and the like; only 
three were directed at insurers.92 Two of the actions against insurers were for 
selling health-benefit plans that did not comply with the law, and only one 
concerned claim practices; Aetna Health was fined $850,000 for improperly 
delaying and denying claims and misinforming consumers.93 
C. Why Administrative Regulation Has Failed 
The failure of administrative regulation to substantially improve the market 
for claim practices or to improve claim practices through direct enforcement 
presents a paradox: insurance may be the most highly regulated industry in the 
United States, but regulators have not performed very well in this area. In fact, 
insurance regulators do very well in ensuring the solvency of companies, 
reasonably well in controlling the rates companies charge, and not at all well in 
regulating insurers’ market conduct, including their claim practices.94 Many factors 
 
90. A third limitation is that penalties are never imposed on individual officers or agents of 
the company, as they are imposed on individual licensees and, more to the point, on insurance 
consumers and care providers in cases of insurance fraud. Many states have enacted statutes that 
require companies to report to regulators whenever they have “reason to believe” that a “fraudulent 
insurance act” has been committed. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 176.05 (McKinney 2015). The statutes 
apply only to false statements made by applicants for insurance, policyholders, victims who present 
claims to companies, doctors who treat those victims, and the lawyers who represent those victims. 
However, the statutes do not apply to false statements made by employees of insurers to 
policyholders or others. See Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance: Perceptions of Influence in Insurance 
Fraud Prosecutions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (2008). 
91. See generally 2013 Insurance Enforcement Activity, STATE N.J. DEP’T BANKING & INS.,   
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_insurance/insfines13.htm [https://perma.cc/R2TM-
TVNE] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. The hypothetical offered by Kyle Logue captures the insurance-claim practices setting very 
well: “[t]hink of a regulatory agency that has a large budget for safety research, but that has a relatively 
paltry enforcement budget (and little stomach for fining the heck out of non-compliers), such that 
any regulated scofflaw’s prospect of being sanctioned by the agency is fairly small.” Kyle D. Logue, 
Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2342 (2010). 
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produce these results, but a plausible hypothesis is that insurance regulation is 
most effective where the public interest and industry interests align and least 
effective where those interests conflict.95 In solvency regulation, regulators protect 
the public against financially insecure insurers while solving a collective action 
problem for insurers. Insolvency often results from collecting premiums that are 
too low or taking risks that are too great, and if one insurer does that, others must 
race to the bottom in order to compete. Even insurers that are able to resist are 
disadvantaged because the failure of one company diminishes the public’s faith in 
all insurance companies and reduces the demand for all insurers’ products. Where 
there is the strongest conflict between the public interest and industry interests, 
regulation is weaker and less effective, and surely the conflict is strongest in the 
regulation of claim practices.96 
This hypothesis suggests that what is in play in market-conduct regulation is 
a form of regulatory capture.97 Susan Randall comments that “the problem of 
capture as it exists in other regulatory contexts is minimal when compared to the 
problem in the insurance industry.”98 There is certainly sufficient evidence for that 
proposition. The revolving door between regulators and industry swings 
frequently.99 The industry is a major campaign donor at the state and federal level. 
Influence also comes from organizations, and the insurance industry teems with 
organizations that generate research and public-relations materials that shape the 
thinking of regulators100 and “govern governance.”101 Industry influence is 
magnified by the unusual structure of insurance regulation in which an industry 
dominated by huge, national and multinational corporations is regulated in fifty 
state capitals with coordination done by the public-private NAIC, which has its 
own issues with industry influence.102 And insurance issues tend to be complex 
 
95. For a survey of theories of regulation as applied to the insurance industry, see KENNETH 
J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE 18–32, 137–66 
(1988). Meier identifies as operational variables in regulation the resources of industry groups, 
consumer groups, regulatory bureaucrats, and political elites. Id. at 138–41. 
96. And in between the results are varied, almost random. 
97. “Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is 
consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the 
regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, 
Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 
2014) (emphasis in original). 
98. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 639 (1999). 
99. Four-fifths of the recent presidents of the NAIC have gone on to work for the industry. 
A study of all state insurance commissioners serving over a seventeen-year period found that half 
went into the insurance industry after leaving office. Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Philips, Regulator 
Performance, Regulatory Environment, and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on 
State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116 (2008). 
100. See James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 27 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 253 (2014) (ideological 
capture). 
101. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 151 (2003). 
102. See Randall, supra note 98, at 629. 
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and of low public visibility, except when sparked by major events such as 
Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy.103 
Insurance-industry capture of regulation provides a good example of the 
nuances of contemporary approaches to the understanding of capture.104 
First, the early literature on regulatory capture focused on attempts by a 
regulated industry to obtain favorable regulations from an administrative agency 
that had primary responsibility for regulating the industry, such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the railroad industry. But capture more accurately 
includes both statutory and regulatory capture—influencing legislation and also 
rulemaking and enforcement under that legislation.105 
The limits of the effective regulation of claim practices are both statutory 
and administrative. In most states, for example, regulators are barred by statute 
from making public data from the MCAS on an individual company basis, data 
that could be used to improve the market for claim practices.106 And where 
regulators have the statutory authority to publish claims data, they fail to do so. 
Second, capture scholarship commonly has focused on industry efforts to 
obtain favorable regulation. But capture may also be “corrosive,” in which the 
industry “push[es] the regulatory process in a ‘weaker’ direction . . . with the aim 
of reducing costly rules and enforcement actions that reduce firm profits.”107 
Claim-practices regulation inherently favors insurance consumers over 
insurers, but capture guarantees that the tilt is not too great. The modest 
enforcement penalties available in most states and the even more modest efforts at 
actual enforcement in claim practices cases demonstrate that nominally 
proconsumer regulation can be corroded. 
III. LITIGATION AS REGULATION 
In a classic article on the choice between regulation and litigation as vehicles 
for optimizing social behavior, Steven Shavell commented that: 
[N]either tort liability nor regulation could uniformly dominate the other 
as a solution to the problem of controlling risks, but also that they should 
not be viewed as mutually exclusive solutions to it. A complete solution 
to the problem of the control of risk evidently should involve the joint 
 
103. MEIER, supra note 95, at 30–31 (emphasizing the influence on regulation of salience—an 
issue “characterized by intense conflict of a broad scope”—and complexity). 
104. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 97, at 9 (“Perhaps the deepest problem with much of 
the research on regulatory capture is . . . its lack of nuance in describing how and to what degree 
capture works in particular settings.”). For a review of the literature, see PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 23–172. 
105. Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 57, 58–60. 
106. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
107. Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in 
FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 152, 154; 
Carpenter & Moss, supra note 97, at 16. 
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use of liability and regulation . . . .108 
The same holds true for the problem of controlling the risk that insurers will 
violate claim practices standards. The market fails to adequately control that risk, 
so regulation is needed. Administrative regulation would not be completely 
effective in theory and is largely ineffective in practice. Therefore, private litigation 
is needed to serve a regulatory function as well.109 
The relative weight given to regulation and litigation in particular contexts 
depends on a variety of factors. Solvency regulation has long been a primary focus 
of regulators. Insurance commissioners erect strict barriers to insurers’ entry into 
insurance markets and rigorously police capital requirements, reserves, and the like 
on an ongoing basis. As a result, the insolvency of insurers that plagued earlier 
generations is rare today. Moreover, litigation is unlikely to be an effective remedy 
for insolvency as it does not provide ongoing supervision but only occurs after the 
fact, when the occurrence of insolvency itself prevents an effective recovery in 
litigation. Therefore, litigation by private parties has a minimal role to play in 
ensuring solvency. 
Where the actions of insurers are less rigorously policed initially, leading to 
regulatory underenforcement, however, there is a greater need for litigation as a 
supplement to administrative regulation. Claim practices is such an area.110 And 
litigation about claim practices, unlike litigation about insolvency, can contribute 
substantially to regulation. 
A. The Advantages of Litigation as Regulation 
There are three reasons that litigation can play an important role in the 
regulation of claim practices: information, cost, and remedy. 
The first reason relates to the superior knowledge and incentives available to 
private plaintiffs as compared to regulators. Where an area is ongoing and highly 
complex, requiring extensive data gathering and study, for example, regulators are 
in a better position to acquire and assess the information needed to define and 
administer regulation. On the other hand, where transactions are remote from 
regulators, discrete, and of low visibility, private parties engaged in or affected by 
the transactions are in a better position to recognize and process information 
 
108. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation for Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 365 
(1984); see also Logue, supra note 94. See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip 
Viscusi ed., 2002). 
109. Abraham calls litigation of this type “forward-looking” because it deals with both past 
and continuing actions. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Insurance Effects of Regulation by Litigation, in 
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 108, at 212, 231. Political conservatives and 
industry advocates often decry both administrative regulation and regulation through litigation. The 
position of Friedrich Hayek, a principal intellectual forbearer of modern conservatism, was clearer, 
opposing centralized administration but recognizing the need for regulation through liability rules. See 
Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 383 (2007). 
110. “Ex post accountability is the prerequisite for ex ante liberalization. Without ex post 
mechanisms, the American experiment in deregulation becomes a free-wheeling descent into 
nonregulation.” Issacharoff, supra note 109, at 385. 
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about the subject.111 
For claim practices, policyholders are in a better position than regulators to 
be informed about insurers’ departure from standards and to use that information 
in litigation. That is true even though an insurer’s actions on an individual claim 
typically are the product of a system in place for the resolution of many claims 
because the system is only instantiated on a case-by-case basis. This is a 
paradigmatic instance in which private parties have superior knowledge compared 
to administrators because “the alleged wrongdoing is fairly concrete and aimed 
directly at or knowingly suffered by private individuals.”112 
Related are the different incentives presented to private parties and to 
regulators. At their worst regulators may be subject to capture, and at their best 
they may be burdened with many issues and have inadequate resources to meet 
them. As long as litigation provides an effective and efficient remedy, private 
plaintiffs have the incentive to pursue litigation with regulatory effects.113 
The second reason is that the administrative costs of properly regulating 
claims practices would be prohibitive.114 The promulgation of claim practices 
standards through statute and regulations is a relatively low-cost activity, because 
the standards are general and reflect widely accepted norms. The enforcement of 
those standards, however, would require much more extensive resources. Market-
conduct examinations are sometimes routine but, under NAIC standards, may be 
triggered by factors such as an excess of consumer complaints. Conducting an 
examination focused on the substance of claims, as through closed file reviews, 
would be very expensive, as would the continued monitoring required to assure 
that deficiencies identified in the examination are corrected. 
Litigation about claims practices is not cheap. But it has two financial 
advantages over administrative enforcement. First, the expense is only triggered 
when there is a plausible basis for believing that the standards have been 
violated—that is, a policyholder and her lawyer together have made a 
determination that the policyholder may have a claim that justifies the expense of 
litigation.115 Second, at least part of the expense is ameliorated because the inquiry 
is initially focused on a particular case, even though it may broaden to evaluate 
institutional practices. 
A related point is the advantage of litigation in developing claim practices 
standards. Many of the standards as stated in statute, rule, or decision are 
necessarily general; litigation enables courts to apply claim practices standards in 
 
111. Shavell, supra note 108, at 359–61. 
112. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1181 (2012). 
113. What has been described as “the eagerness of entrepreneurially motivated private 
actors,” Issacharoff, supra note 109 at 383, or “those parties who have sufficient incentives to 
operationalize that information through enforcement,” Glover, supra note 112, at 1178. 
114. Shavell, supra note 108, at 363–64. 
115. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule Over 
Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2013). 
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individual cases and to develop a more complete and more refined body of law. 
The third reason is that in addition to serving a regulatory function, litigation 
also serves important purposes that are not well served by direct administrative 
regulation. Most obviously, litigation provides recompense to those who have 
been injured by claim practices violations. It also serves the public value of private 
participation in the regulatory process, as it “frees individuals from total 
dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies and gives them a personal role 
and stake in the administration of justice.”116 
B. Coverage Litigation as Regulation 
Litigation about ordinary insurance coverage disputes revolves around the 
interpretation and application of the terms of the insurance policy.117 But there is a 
sense in which this ordinary litigation is regulatory as well. 
In a typical coverage case, the court begins with the relevant policy language. 
If the court does not find an unambiguous application of the language to the facts 
of the case, the court resorts to a variety of interpretive doctrines to resolve the 
issue. Policy language is interpreted against the company as its drafter. Grants of 
coverage are interpreted broadly and exclusions narrowly. The reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder are given weight. 
As a formal matter, interpretation doctrines look to the moment of contract 
formation. A term is construed against the insurer-drafter because at the time the 
contract was made, it had control of the language and could have resolved any 
ambiguity, presumably in its own favor. If the insurer-drafter did not do so, the 
fault is its own, and the insured should not suffer the consequences. Similarly, the 
insured at the moment of formation had reasonable expectations about coverage 
under the policy, created by representations of the insurer and its agents or more 
general understandings about the allocation of risks under the policy. If the insurer 
creates policy language that is inconsistent with the insured’s expectations, it has 
the obligation to clarify the situation or bear the adverse consequences. 
In commercial contracts generally, these doctrines apply by focusing on the 
moment of formation.118 In the insurance context, however, especially in 
consumer cases, the market failures inherent in insurance give them quite a 
different cast, a cast that courts sometimes recognize explicitly but more often use 
implicitly. All of these issues arise only at the point of claim, of course. The 
problems of asymmetric information, agency, and opportunism yield a situation in 
which the actions an insurer takes in drafting the contract provide the vehicles for 
action at the point of claim. An insurer drafts policy language knowing that the 
language is not subject to negotiation and that the insured is unlikely to read or 
understand it. The insurer also knows that at the point of claim, it will have 
 
116. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law?: The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 
198 (1987). 
117. And sometimes allied doctrines such as waiver and estoppel. 
118. Or subsequent events, in the cases of waiver and estoppel. 
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considerable discretion in evaluating the claim, the insured is likely to be 
necessitous of resolution, and it will be time-consuming and expensive for the 
insured to dispute the insurer’s interpretation of the contract or evaluation of the 
claim. In light of these factors, the interpretive doctrines are not only about 
ascertaining meaning by looking back to the drafting process but also about 
correcting the inherent imbalance in the claim process. 
The difficulty of regulating insurer conduct in this way is summed up in Karl 
Llewellyn’s aphorism that “[c]overt tools are never reliable tools.”119 Covert tools 
invite attempts at redrafting and provide insufficient guidance for the future. 
[S]ince they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either 
experience or authority in the needed direction: that of marking out for 
any given type of transaction what the minimum decencies are which a court 
will insist upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or 
as being inherent in a bargain of that type.120 
For Llewellyn the “given type of transaction” referred to the type of contract; the 
problem with interpretation as a covert tool is even more pronounced when the 
issue is another step removed from formation, namely defining the “minimum 
decencies” of claim practices. 
C. Claim Practices Litigation as Regulation 
Regulation requires standards to which a regulated entity must adhere, a 
mechanism for applying those standards, and a means of enforcing adherence to 
the standards or of making violations of them sufficiently costly to deter such 
violations. In order for claim practices litigation to best serve a regulatory 
function, therefore, what is required is a liability rule that reflects proper claim 
practices standards and that is capable of being operationalized effectively and 
efficiently, a correlative damage rule that provides adequate incentives for 
plaintiffs and achieves an appropriate level of deterrence for insurers, sufficient 
visibility of the rule, and a remedy for potential plaintiffs. 
The focus of this Article is first-party insurance, but litigation surrounding a 
liability insurer’s duty to settle illustrates how these requirements can be met 
effectively. A typical liability insurance policy by its terms creates a duty of the 
insurer to defend claims against the insured and reserves to the insurer the right to 
settle litigation. Even though the policy does not do so, courts uniformly hold that 
the obligation of good faith limits the insurer’s discretion in settlement, creating a 
duty to make reasonable settlement decisions.121 The courts adopt various tests to 
define the limit—good faith and fair dealing, due care, reasonableness, equal 
consideration to the insured’s interests—but “the differences among them are 
 
119. K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing O. 
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND 
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)). 
120. Id. 
121. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 832–49. 
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subtle” 122 and they coalesce around a standard of whether an insurer that bore 
sole financial responsibility for the judgment would have accepted the plaintiff’s 
offer to settle.123 As applied, the standard provides a substantial guide for insurer’s 
behavior. In litigation the standard requires evidence of the kind presented in the 
underlying trial and expert evaluation of that evidence, so the litigation can be 
expensive. But as a practical matter, most cases settle, reducing the costs of 
litigation.124 
Although the duty to settle arises out of contract, the bad-faith action often 
is characterized as lying in tort, not contract. The principal advantage to this 
characterization is the more expansive damages available, including damages not 
subject to the limitations on consequential damages in contract law and in some 
cases punitive damages. Jerry and Richmond summarize the advantages of this 
characterization, all of which relate to its effectiveness as a remedy for the 
violation of claim practices standards. 
First, the extra damages recoverable in tort can help compensate the 
insured’s attorney, and thus help give the insured a full remedy for the 
insurer’s breach of the duty to settle, unimpaired by the transaction costs 
of securing the remedy. Second, without the availability of tort remedies, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will be reluctant to represent insureds, and it is unlikely 
that the insureds would find representations of a quality routinely 
available to insurers. Third, unless the insurer is liable for extracontractual 
damages, it has little incentive to perform its contract obligations. If the 
most that contract will award is the cost of performing the contract 
obligations, insurers will refuse to perform at all in some of the cases, 
knowing that some insured will not take the time or trouble to pursue the 
contract remedies.125 
In short, the duty to settle is implemented through a litigation system that 
provides adequate incentives for all parties and compensation to the insured. 
Because of the breadth of the system, the development of a bar that makes 
extensive use of the system makes it almost certain that policyholders will become 
aware of the system and will be able to implement it. The duty to settle therefore 
provides a model for the ways in which the regulatory purposes of litigation can 
be achieved. 
1. Claim Practices Standards 
In first-party insurance cases, there are numerous legal formulations of claim 
practices standards, some mandated by statute and implementing regulations, 
others from common law. The most common statutory standards reside in 
enactments of the NAIC’s Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, some 
 
122. Id. at 836. 
123. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 27(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2014). 
124. BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 4, at 511. 
125. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 839–40. 
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version of which has been adopted in nearly every state.126 Those standards do not 
always constitute a liability rule enforceable through private litigation; some 
statutes create a private right of action, most do not, and some courts use the 
statutory standard, directly or indirectly, as defining the content of an insurer’s 
enforceable obligation. The statutory standards often are supplemented by more 
specific regulations.127 
Judicial standards are most commonly set within the body of law known 
generally but inexactly as “bad faith.”128 About a half-dozen states use some 
variation of the Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. standard of reasonableness, or 
acting with proper cause.129 A much larger group of states has adopted some 
version of the “fairly debatable” rule: “To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff 
must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy 
and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable 
basis for denying the claim.”130 
I have argued elsewhere that the fairly debatable rule does not accurately 
reflect the common-law origins of the contractual obligation of good faith on 
which it is based, nor does it honor the nature of the insurance relation.131 For 
present purposes, three factors are especially important. 
First, the nature of the insurance relation is one in which the insured 
purchases security and not just contractual rights. The fairly debatable rule fails to 
honor this relation. In effect, it includes in the policy a term that renders the 
insurer immune from full damages in the event of a negligent coverage decision or 
an improper claim practice unless the insurer acted with the intent to harm the 
policyholder’s interests or in reckless disregard of them. This limitation is absurd; 
no company would sell and no consumer would buy a policy that contained such a 
provision. 
Second, the problems of asymmetric information, agency, and opportunism 
that plague the market for claim practices also are salient here. A strong standard 
is necessary to substitute for the insured’s inability to define and monitor the 
insurer’s behavior at the point of claim. 
Third, the fairly debatable rule fails to provide adequate incentives to enforce 
standards. From the insured’s perspective, it is much too difficult to establish a 
violation of standards under the rule. In New Jersey, for example, the Supreme 
Court adopted the fairly debatable rule in Pickett v. Lloyd’s in 1993.132 In the two 
decades since, only about fifty-five cases involved an adjudicated claim under 
 
126. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 1997). 
127. See, e.g., UNFAIR PROPERTY/CASUALTY CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES MODEL 
REGULATION (NAT’L ASS’N INS. OF COMM’RS 1997). 
128. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 693 (2012). 
129. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
130. Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978). 
131. See generally Feinman, supra note 128. 
132. Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993). 
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Pickett; only five of those survived summary judgment, and only Pickett itself 
involved a claim that was successful before a jury.133 
Therefore, the appropriate liability rule is that an insurer must promptly, 
fairly, and objectively process, investigate, evaluate, and resolve the claim. This 
rule can be given further content by legislative and administrative standards and 
judicial application. For example, the rule requires an insurer to reasonably 
investigate a claim.134 The duty to investigate requires the insurer to seek evidence 
that potentially supports a claim, not just evidence that favors a denial,135 including 
even bases for coverage beyond those advanced by the insured.136 It includes the 
responsibility to use the insurer’s own resources to investigate rather than simply 
relying on its insured or others, to interview witnesses or others with relevant 
information,137 to search for and consider evidence contrary to its own interests,138 
to attempt to resolve apparent conflicts with the insured,139 to consider alternative 
explanations,140 to use competent personnel to investigate,141 and to use experts 
who are independent, objective, and unbiased.142 
2. Remedies 
The lack of effective remedies for violations of claim practices standards 
renders the standards ineffective; the insured would not be compensated for the 
injury incurred and the company would not have a financial incentive to observe 
the standards if damages are limited to the amount owed under the policy. 
The damages rule should be the correlative of the liability rule. If the 
policyholder litigates to enforce the company’s obligations under the policy, its 
initial remedy is to receive the benefits to which it was expressly entitled: payment 
of the claim. That remedy is insufficient to fully protect the policyholder’s interest. 
The policyholder may suffer consequential economic loss from the failure to 
receive, whether in a timely manner or at all, the benefits owed under the 
 
133. H. Richard Chattmann & Aaron H. Gould, Revisiting Pickett v. Lloyds: A Survey, 
Assessment, and Practice Pointers Regarding New Jersey First-Party Insurance Bad Faith Law, N.J. LAW., Aug. 
2012, at 16. 
134. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4(C) (NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMM’RS 1997); see Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 171 P.3d 1082, 1088 (Cal. 2007). 
135. See Bernstein v. Travelers Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Wilson, 
171 P.3d at 1087; Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Cal. 1979); STEVEN PLITT ET. 
AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 207:25 (3d ed. 2011). This conforms to industry standards. See DORIS 
HOOPES, THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 10.7 (2d ed. 2000) (“Claims representatives should investigate 
in an unbiased way, pursuing all relevant evidence, especially that which establishes the legitimacy of a 
claim.”). 
136. Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
137. Estate of Parker ex rel. Parker v. AIG Life Ins., 317 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
138. Jordan, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 320. 
139. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 46–47 (Tex. 1998). 
140. Hensley v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 210 S.W.3d 455, 468–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
141. See PLITT ET. AL., supra note 135, § 207:25; see also WILLIAM T. BARKER & RONALD D. 
KENT, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 4.06 (2d ed. 2014). 
142. Guebara v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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policy.143 This loss may include a variety of types of harm, depending on the type 
of insurance and the particular facts, and it includes the expense incurred in 
pursuing the claim as a result of the company’s breach of its obligation to process 
the claim reasonably. Because of the special nature of insurance policies, the 
American rule on attorney’s fees and the rule of limited expectation damages 
should not be applied to deny recovery for litigation expenses.144 Particularly in 
personal lines situations, where peace of mind is part of what is being purchased 
with the policy, the insured also may suffer compensable emotional harm. 
Payment under the policy alone also is an insufficient disincentive to the 
insurance company’s temptation to behave opportunistically. By delaying or 
denying payment to the policyholder, the company increases its own profits at the 
expense of its policyholder. If the company is liable only for the amount it owed 
under the policy, the only check on opportunism is the reputational effect of 
unreasonable claim practices, which works notoriously poorly in the insurance 
market. Indeed, many policyholders who are denied what they are owed will not 
pursue either their claims under the policy or the claim practices cause of action, 
providing further incentive for the company to act unreasonably. Accordingly, 
damages beyond the policy limits, including punitive damages in appropriate 
cases,145 are necessary to reinforce the standard of reasonableness. 
3. The Conduct of Regulatory Claim Practices Litigation 
For claim practices litigation to serve a regulatory function, the liability rule 
and damage rule need to be operationalized effectively and efficiently. Currently, 
claim practices litigation often has a significant problem in that respect: it is 
protracted and expensive. Partly, this is due to the usual need in complex cases to 
conduct extensive discovery and retain experts.146 Partly, according to 
policyholder advocates, it may be due to insurers’ strategy of denying claims and 
delaying litigation in order to pressure policyholders to settle and to reap 
investment profits on delayed payments.147 
Much of the time and expense of claim practices litigation is unavoidable in a 
litigation system with extensive discovery and, at least potentially, jury trials. Even 
 
143. E.g., Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 
2008); Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 2008). 
144. E.g., Brandt v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 796, 798–99 (Cal. 1985); White v. W. Title Ins. 
Co., 710 P.2d 309, 320 (Cal. 1985). The California courts point out that the recovery of attorney’s fees 
in such cases is not a violation of the American rule against the award of attorney’s fees. Instead, the 
fees and litigation expenses are damages that flow from the insurance company’s breach of its good-
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PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 13:17 (3d ed. 2011). 
145. E.g., Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 347–48 (Haw. 1996); Anderson 
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2012). 
146. Charles Miller, The Scope of Expert Testimony in Insurance Bad Faith Cases: Can the Expert 
Testify on the Meaning of the Policy?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 211, 216–17 (2008). 
147. See FEINMAN, supra note 21. 
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though most cases settle, they do so only after many of these costs already have 
been incurred. This Article’s initial discussion of the regulatory function of claim 
practices litigation is not the place to fully explore alternatives, but two points 
merit further exploration. 
First, much of the time and expense of this litigation is about the scope of 
discovery. Routinizing discovery would reduce this litigation, which is collateral to 
the main issues in the cases, and therefore would reduce delay and expense. For 
example, an insurer could be required to produce the complete claims file, all 
relevant claims manuals, claims committee notes and procedures, and the like. 
Second, many of the allegations of violations of claim practices standards 
concern not the individual actions of rogue adjusters but systematic practices 
throughout the company. Discovery of information about these practices is 
relevant to a large number of cases, but its disclosure is often barred by blanket 
confidentiality agreements or umbrella protective orders. Such agreements and 
orders are appropriate to protect trade secrets, but, when overbroad, they simply 
impose additional costs on future plaintiffs. For that reason, and because 
disclosure serves the public interest, such orders should be discouraged. 
D. The Effects of Regulatory Litigation 
A regulatory approach to claim practices litigation obviously has an 
immediate impact in individual cases brought by policyholders. A strong liability 
rule with significant remedies increases the ability of policyholders to enforce 
insurers’ obligations, producing more successful litigation and settlements. But 
defining litigation as regulatory requires a greater impact than simply affecting the 
resolution of individual disputes. Regulatory litigation, strong or weak, has a 
systemic impact on insurers’ behavior. 
Regulatory litigation affects the incentives of insurers, which in turn affects 
their behavior in the large run of cases that do not result in litigation. As with any 
class of potential defendants, insurers measure their potential liability costs against 
the costs and benefits of compliance or violation, discounting the amount of 
potential liability by the probability that suits for violations will be brought. The 
regulatory function of litigation is better served as insurers’ potential liability 
increases as the liability rule, remedies, and probability of suit become stronger. In 
the absence of effective regulatory litigation, compliance with claim-practice 
standards is determined by the market and by administrative regulation, which as 
described above is inadequate to accomplish the task. 
These effects are obvious. However, there is an additional important, 
interactive process among the elements of insurers’ calculations. Strengthening the 
liability rule and remedies causes an increase in the probability of litigation in the 
short term because it increases the potential value of litigation to policyholders. 
The long term, systemic effect of the strengthening is more important and 
iterative in that it contributes to the development of a policyholder bar. The 
presence of such a bar is a prerequisite to effective regulatory litigation, a 
prerequisite that is filled once economic incentives are created from the stronger 
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liability rule and remedies. This specialized bar is available to potential clients—
indeed, it recruits potential clients—and it can make the investment necessary to 
pursue actions and develop the degree of expertise needed to combat the 
comparable expertise on the insurers’ side. Much of this process is furthered by 
the development of creation of networks and organizations of lawyers. An 
obvious illustration is the development of a plaintiffs’ personal injury bar and its 
professional organizations that were spurred by, and then contributed to, the 
expansion of tort law through the mid-twentieth century. In the insurance arena, 
anecdotally the policyholder insurance bar seems to be broader and stronger in 
states with more effective law and remedies for bad faith than in other states. 
Because discovery in claim practices cases can be extensive, including 
discovery with respect to systematic violations of claim practices, litigation also 
serves a regulatory function in producing information that exposes insurer 
practices to scrutiny and potentially reframes the discussion about claim practices 
and the need to address violations. This information-producing function is highly 
important in spurring further litigation, administrative and legislative action, and 
public awareness.148 The controversy about the use by many insurers of Colossus, 
an expert system for estimating general damages, illustrates the intertwined loops 
that begin with discovery in litigation, produce more litigation, transform ordinary 
litigation into regulatory litigation, and spur administrative action. Colossus can 
produce consistency across claims, but it also can be abused to underpay claims 
through limiting the data input to the system, through “tuning” in converting the 
Colossus severity point report into a dollar figure, and through treating its 
estimate as binding rather than a guide for adjusters’ judgments.149 Instances of 
misuse of Colossus became apparent only through discovery in litigation.150 
Ultimately, the issue became of such visibility that it resulted in a Multistate 
Market Conduct examination of Allstate’s use of the system; the Regulatory 
Agreement that concluded the MCE noted two class actions as the source of 
information.151 Although the regulators purported to find no systematic 
underpayment of claims, they did find widespread inconsistencies in the tuning of 
the program and required Allstate to alter its use of Colossus. 
The impact of regulatory litigation is demonstrated by empirical research on 
the effect of different standards for determining bad faith and different damages 
available for violations of claim practices. Claims are resolved more quickly; 
according to one study, claims are thirteen percent more likely to close in a given 
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2010 WL 4020127, at *3. 
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period with considerable benefits to insurance consumers.152 Claims also are less 
likely to be paid below the amount of economic losses claimed,153 and claim 
payouts for both economic and noneconomic damages are likely to be higher with 
the former showing a greater increase.154 Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, the 
benefit of regulatory litigation accrues more to claimants unrepresented by 
counsel than to those with lawyers by a factor of ten.155 
CONCLUSION 
The market for insurance works well in some respects. In all lines of 
insurance, prospective policyholders have an abundance of information to 
compare prices. Because the market does not always work so well, the insurance 
industry is highly regulated, and much of the regulation is highly successful. 
During the financial crisis that began in 2008, only a handful of insurers became 
insolvent, a success attributable to effective solvency regulation. 
But the success of the market and of the regulation of market failures has 
not been uniform. There is no effective market for quality in claim practices, and 
regulators have not provided adequate controls. The market could be improved 
and administrative regulation could be strengthened. Even if that happens, 
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